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1. Classical hybrid logic
The term “hybrid logic” covers a number of logics obtained by adding further expressive power to ordinary modal logic.1
The history of what now is known as hybrid logic goes back to the philosopher Arthur Prior’s work in the 1960s. See the
handbook chapters [28] and [27] for general accounts of Prior’s work. See also the paper [4]. The term “hybrid logic” was
coined in Patrick Blackburn and Jerry Seligman’s paper [5] published in 1995. The work of Prior, Blackburn, and Seligman
took place in the context of classical modal logic, which is the case with most work on hybrid logic. See the handbook
chapter [2] for a detailed overview of classical hybrid logic. See the book [10] on hybrid logic and its proof-theory, also
covering intuitionistic hybrid logic.
The most basic hybrid logic is obtained by extending ordinary modal logic with nominals, which are propositional sym-
bols of a new sort. In the classical Kripke semantics a nominal is interpreted in a restricted way such that it is true at
exactly one point. Points usually represent possible worlds, times, locations, epistemic states, states in a computer, or some-
thing else. If the points are given a temporal reading, this enables the formalization of natural language statements that are
true at exactly one time, for example
it is ﬁve o’clock May 10th 2007,
which is true at the time ﬁve o’clock May 10th 2007, but false at all other times. Such statements cannot be formalized
in ordinary modal logic, the reason being that there is only one sort of propositional symbol available, namely ordinary
propositional symbols, which are not restricted to being true at exactly one point.
Most hybrid logics involve further additional machinery than nominals. There is a number of options for adding further
machinery; here we shall consider a kind of operator called satisfaction operators. The motivation for adding satisfaction op-
erators is to be able to formalize a statement being true at a particular time, possible world, or something else. For example,
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1438 T. Braüner / Information and Computation 209 (2011) 1437–1446we want to be able to formalize that the statement “it is raining” is true at the time ﬁve o’clock May 10th 2007, that is,
that
at ﬁve o’clock May 10th 2007, it is raining.
This is formalized by the formula @ar where the nominal a stands for “it is ﬁve o’clock May 10th 2007” as above and where
r is an ordinary propositional symbol that stands for “it is raining”. It is the part @a of the formula @ar that is called a sat-
isfaction operator. In general, if a is a nominal and φ is an arbitrary formula, then a new formula @aφ can be built (in some
literature the notation a : φ is used instead of @aφ). A formula of this form is called a satisfaction statement, cf. [3]. The
formula @aφ expresses that the formula φ is true at one particular point, namely the point to which the nominal a refers.
Nominals and satisfaction operators are the most common pieces of hybrid-logical machinery. Some hybrid logics also
involve what is called the downarrow binder, which allow us to build formulas of the form ↓ aφ. The downarrow binder
binds a nominal to the point of evaluation, that is, the formula ↓ aφ is true relative to a point w if and only if φ is
true relative to w when a refers to w . However, the downarrow binder has hithertho not been used in the context of
intuitionistic hybrid logic, so we shall not consider it further in the present work.2
In what follows we give the formal syntax and semantics of classical hybrid logic. It is assumed that a set of ordinary
propositional symbols and a countably inﬁnite set of nominals are given. The sets are assumed to be disjoint. The metavari-
ables p, q, r, . . . range over ordinary propositional symbols and a, b, c, . . . range over nominals. Formulas are deﬁned by the
following grammar.
S ::= p | a | S ∧ S | S → S | ⊥ | S | @a S
A ﬁnite number of modal operators could have been considered, but in the interest of simplicity, we shall stick to one oper-
ator. The metavariables φ, ψ , θ , . . . range over formulas. Negation is deﬁned by the convention that ¬φ is an abbreviation
for φ → ⊥. Similarly, φ ∨ ψ is an abbreviation for ¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) and ♦φ is an abbreviation for ¬¬φ.
Deﬁnition 1. A model for classical hybrid logic is a tuple (W , R, {Vw}w∈W ) where
1. W is a non-empty set;
2. R is a binary relation on W ; and
3. for each w , Vw is a function that to each ordinary propositional symbol assigns an element of {0,1}.
The pair (W , R) is called a frame and the model is said to be based on this frame. The elements of W are called worlds and
the relation R is called the accessibility relation. A propositional symbol p is said to be true at w if Vw(p) = 1 and it is said
to be false at w if Vw(p) = 0.
Note that a model for classical hybrid logic is the same as a model for ordinary modal logic. To give an extremely
simple example of a model, we let W = {w, v} and R = {(w, v)}, and moreover, we let Vw(p) = 0 and V v(p) = 1. All other
propositional symbols than p are ignored. This model can be depicted as
w

 v


p
where circles represent worlds and an arrow indicates that two worlds are related by the accessibility relation. A proposi-
tional symbol in a circle means that the symbol is true and the absence of a propositional symbol means that it is false.
Given a model M= (W , R, {Vw}w∈W ), an assignment is a function g that to each nominal assigns an element of W . The
relation M, g,w | φ is deﬁned by induction, where g is an assignment, w is an element of W , and φ is a formula.
M, g,w | p iff Vw(p) = 1
M, g,w | a iff w = g(a)
M, g,w | φ ∧ ψ iff M, g,w | φ andM, g,w | ψ
M, g,w | φ → ψ iff M, g,w | φ impliesM, g,w | ψ
M, g,w | ⊥ iff falsum
M, g,w |φ iff for any v ∈ W such that wRv ,M, g, v | φ
M, g,w |@aφ iff M, g, g(a) | φ
By convention M, g | φ means M, g,w | φ for every element w of W and M | φ means M, g | φ for every assign-
ment g . A formula φ is valid in a frame if and only if M | φ for any model M that is based on the frame. A formula φ is
2 It should be remarked this classical interpretation of the downarrow binder naturally carries over to an intuitionistic interpretation, and the author of
the present paper does not foresee problems adding derivation rules for the downarrow binder to proof-systems for intuitionistic hybrid logic.
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only if φ is valid in the class of all frames.
The fact that hybridizing ordinary modal logic actually does give more expressive power can for example be seen by
considering the formula c → ¬c. It is straightforward to check that this formula is valid in a frame if and only if the
frame is irreﬂexive. Thus, irreﬂexivity can be expressed by a hybrid-logical formula, but it is well known that it cannot be
expressed by any formula of ordinary modal logic. Many other such examples can be given. More information on classical
hybrid logic can be found in the book [10] and works referred to therein.
2. From classical to intuitionistic hybrid logic
We now come to intuitionistic hybrid logic. The formulas of intuitionistic hybrid logic are the same as those of classical
hybrid logic deﬁned above, except that the connectives ∨ and ♦ are taken to be primitive, the reason being that they are
not intuitionistically deﬁnable in terms of the other connectives (contrary to the classical case).
As we mentioned earlier, intuitionistic hybrid logic is obtained by replacing the classical logic basis of hybrid modal logic
by an intuitionistic logic basis. Thus, two logics are combined, namely intuitionistic logic (which by the standard Kripke
semantics is interpreted in terms of a set of “states of knowledge” equipped with a partial order, called the “epistemic”
partial order, with respect to which the interpretations of propositional symbols are monotone, that is, the interpretations
of propositional symbols are preserved by the partial order) and hybrid modal logic (where modal operators, nominals, and
satisfaction operators are interpreted in terms of a set of possible worlds equipped with an accessibility relation, cf. the
classical semantics described earlier).
The main intuition behind our combined semantics is that we want to give an intuitionistic reading of hybrid modal
logic where a distinction is made between the way of reasoning and what the reasoning is about, that is, we want to
reason intuitionistically about time, space, states in a computer, or whatever the subject-matter is. The principle that logical
reasoning should not depend on what the reasoning is about is expressed many places in the logical literature; one of them
is the following quotation by J.A. Robinson.
The correctness of a piece of reasoning, . . . does not depend on what the reasoning is about (we can see that the
conclusion all epiphorins are turpy follows from the premises all epiphorins are febrids and all febrids are turpy, without
understanding all the words) so much as on how the reasoning is done; on the pattern of relationships between the
various constituent ideas rather than on the actual ideas themselves (see [30], p. 1).
Following this principle, we keep the intuitionistic states of knowledge separate from the modal possible worlds (represent-
ing times, locations, states in a computer, or something else). Consequently, we keep the epistemic partial order separate
from the interpretation of the hybrid-logical machinery as well as the accessibility relation involved in interpreting modal
operators. This is contrary to a number of intuitionistic modal logics where the epistemic partial order and the modal ac-
cessibility relation are relations on the same set, thus, in these logics the way of reasoning is not kept distinct from what
the reasoning is about, see Section 2.4.
In what follows, we give our formal semantics for intuitionistic hybrid logic. The semantics stems from the papers [11]
and [12]. The semantics is an extension of a semantics for intuitionistic modal logic which was introduced in a tense-logical
version in the paper [16] by W.B. Ewald. We ﬁrst deﬁne models.
Deﬁnition 2. A model for intuitionistic hybrid logic is a tuple
(
W ,, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W
)
where
1. W is a non-empty set partially ordered by ;
2. for each w , Dw is a non-empty set such that w  v implies Dw ⊆ Dv ;
3. for each w , ∼w is an equivalence relation on Dw such that w  v implies ∼w⊆∼v ;
4. for each w , Rw is a binary relation on Dw such that w  v implies Rw ⊆ Rv ; and
5. for each w , Vw is a function that to each ordinary propositional symbol p assigns a subset of Dw such that w  v
implies Vw(p) ⊆ V v(p).
It is assumed that if d ∼w d′ , e ∼w e′ , and dRwe, then d′Rwe′ , and similarly, if d ∼w d′ and d ∈ Vw(p), then d′ ∈ Vw(p).
The tuple (W ,, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W ) is called a frame for intuitionistic hybrid logic and the model is said to
be based on this frame.
As explained above, the elements of the set W are states of knowledge and for any such state w , the set Dw is the set
of possible worlds known in the state of knowledge w , the relation ∼w is the set of known identities between possible
worlds, the relation Rw is the set of known relationships between possible worlds, and the set Vw(p) is the set of possible
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these kinds of knowledge, that is, if an advance to a greater state of knowledge is made, then what is known is preserved.3
We now give a simple example of a model for intuitionistic hybrid logic. We ﬁrst specify that W = {w, v,u} and that
 is the reﬂexive and transitive closure of the relation {(w, v), (v,u)}. Thus, w , v , and u are successively greater states
of knowledge. It remains to specify what is known at each of the three states of knowledge. To keep things as simple as
possible, we ignore the equivalence relation ∼w and we ignore all other propositional symbols than p. The remaining parts
of the example model are speciﬁed below where there is one column for each of state of knowledge.
Dw = {d, e} Dv = {d, e, f } Du = {d, e, f }
Rw =
{
(d, e)
}
Rv =
{
(d, e), (d, f )
}
Ru =
{
(d, e), (d, f )
}
Vw(p) = {e} V v(p) = {e} Vu(p) = {e, f }
Note that each column is a notational variant of a model for classical hybrid logic, cf. Deﬁnition 1. Using this observation,
we can depict the example model for intuitionistic hybrid logic as
w
d

 e


p
v
d

 e


p
f





u
d

 e


p
f


p


 
where each state of knowledge is represented by a box containing a model for classical hybrid logic, depicted in the same
way as the example model following Deﬁnition 1 (beware that it is the possible worlds d, e, and f above that are worlds in
the sense of Deﬁnition 1, not the states of knowledge w , v , and u). Two states of knowledge being related by the epistemic
partial order is indicated by an arrow, but arrows generated by reﬂexivity and transitivity are omitted. Important remark: If
a propositional symbol is absent in a circle representing a possible world, then it means that it is not known whether the
propositional symbol is true at the possible world in question (it does not mean that the propositional symbol is false as
it does in the classical case). Read from left to right, the depiction above says as follows: In state w it is known that the
possible world d has one successor, e, and that p is true at e, in state v it is moreover known that d has a second successor,
f , and in state u it is furthermore known that p is true at f .
Given a model M = (W ,, {Dw}w∈W , {∼w}w∈W , {Rw}w∈W , {Vw}w∈W ) and an element w of W , a w-assignment is a
function g that to each nominal assigns an element of Dw . Note that if g is a w-assignment and w  v , then g is also a
v-assignment (this is used in the clauses below for implication and the  operator). The relation M, g,w,d | φ is deﬁned
by induction, where w is an element of W , g is a w-assignment, d is an element of Dw , and φ is a formula.
M, g,w,d | p iff d ∈ Vw(p)
M, g,w,d | a iff d ∼w g(a)
M, g,w,d | φ ∧ ψ iff M, g,w,d | φ andM, g,w,d | ψ
M, g,w,d | φ ∨ ψ iff M, g,w,d | φ orM, g,w,d | ψ
M, g,w,d | φ → ψ iff for all v  w ,
M, g, v,d | φ impliesM, g, v,d | ψ
M, g,w,d | ⊥ iff falsum
M, g,w,d |φ iff for all v  w , for all e ∈ Dv ,
dRve impliesM, g, v, e | φ
M, g,w,d | ♦φ iff for some e ∈ Dw , dRwe andM, g,w, e | φ
M, g,w,d |@aφ iff M, g,w, g(a) | φ
3 Note that more and more possible worlds might be known, that is, there is a set Dw for each state of knowledge w , subject to the requirement that
Dw ⊆ Dv whenever w  v . One might instead consider having a constant set like in the constant domain semantics for ﬁrst-order modal logic. In the
paper [23] such a constant semantics for intuitionistic ﬁrst-order logic was axiomatized by adding to an axiom system for the usual semantics the axiom
∀a(φ ∨ ψ) → (φ ∨ ∀aψ), where the variable a does not occur in φ. It would be interesting to investigate whether such a constant version of intuitionistic
hybrid logic could be given (whatever proof-theoretic machinery is chosen, it is not clear whether the completeness proof of [11] and [12] can be modiﬁed
as appropriate).
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element w of W and every w-assignment g . A formula φ is valid in a frame if and only if M | φ for any model M that is
based on the frame. A formula φ is valid in a class of frames if and only if φ is valid in every frame in the class of frames
in question. A formula φ is valid if and only if φ is valid in the class of all frames.
Note the difference in the interpretations of the two modal operators: The interpretation of the  operator involves
quantiﬁcation over accessible states of knowledge whereas the interpretation of ♦ does not. This is the case since the modal
operators correspond to quantiﬁers in intuitionistic ﬁrst-order logic, the translation of  involves ∀ and the translation of
♦ involves ∃, and the interpretation of the ∀ quantiﬁer involves the epistemic partial order whereas the interpretation of ∃
does not, see the remarks on translation in the following subsection.
An example of a formula valid in the classical hybrid-logical semantics, but not valid in the intuitionistic semantics, is
@aφ ↔ ¬@a¬φ. This formula should not be valid intuitionistically, but it should be valid classically and it is actually taken
as an axiom for classical hybrid logic by some authors.
The semantics satisfy the following important propositions which are both proved by induction on the structure of
formulas.
Proposition 3 (Monotonicity). IfM, g,w,d | φ and w  v, thenM, g, v,d | φ .
Proposition 4. IfM, g,w,d | φ and d ∼w d′ , thenM, g,w,d′ | φ .
2.1. Motivation via the standard translation
One motivation for intuitionistic hybrid logic can be obtained by considering the translations from classical and intuition-
istic hybrid logic into respectively classical and intuitionistic ﬁrst-order logic with equality. The translations are extensions
of the well-known standard translation from modal logic into ﬁrst-order logic, see [1] and [33].
We ﬁrst consider the classical case. The ﬁrst-order language under consideration has a 1-place predicate symbol corre-
sponding to each ordinary propositional symbol of modal logic, a 2-place predicate symbol corresponding to the modalities,
and a 2-place predicate symbol corresponding to equality. It is assumed that a countably inﬁnite set of ﬁrst-order vari-
ables is given. The metavariables a, b, c, . . . range over ﬁrst-order variables. So the formulas of the ﬁrst-order language we
consider are deﬁned by the grammar
S ::= p∗(a) | R(a,b) | a = b | S ∧ S | S → S | ⊥ | ∀aS
where p ranges over ordinary propositional symbols of hybrid logic. Note that according to the grammar above, for each
ordinary propositional symbol p of the modal language there is a corresponding 1-place predicate symbol p∗ in the ﬁrst-
order language. In what follows, we shall identify ﬁrst-order variables with nominals of hybrid logic. Note in this connection
that the set of metavariables ranging over ﬁrst-order variables is identical to the set of metavariables ranging over nominals.
Free and bound occurrences of variables are deﬁned as usual for ﬁrst-order logic. Also, ψ[c/a] is the formula ψ where the
variable c has been substituted for all free occurrences of the variable a. Variables in ψ are renamed as appropriate.
The translation from classical hybrid logic into classical ﬁrst-order logic with equality proceeds as follows. It is assumed
that two nominals a and b are given which do not occur in the formulas to be translated. The translations STa and STb are
deﬁned by mutual induction. We just give the translation STa . Recall that nominals and ﬁrst-order variables are identiﬁed.
STa(p) = p∗(a)
STa(c) = a = c
STa(φ ∧ ψ) = STa(φ) ∧ STa(ψ)
STa(φ → ψ) = STa(φ) → STa(ψ)
STa(⊥) = ⊥
STa(φ) = ∀b
(
R(a,b) → STb(φ)
)
STa(@cφ) = STa(φ)[c/a]
The deﬁnition of STb is obtained by exchanging a and b. What has been done in the translation is that the semantics of
hybrid logic has been formalized in terms of ﬁrst-order logic; note how each clause in the translation formalizes a clause in
the deﬁnition of the classical semantics, that is, the classical relation M, g,w | φ.
The translation STa is truth-preserving. To state this formally, we make use of the well-known observation that a model
M for classical hybrid logic can be considered a classical ﬁrst-order model, which we denote M∗ . The map (·)∗ which maps
M to M∗ is bijective. Also, an assignment in the sense of classical hybrid logic can be considered as an assignment in
the sense of classical ﬁrst-order logic. Given a model M∗ for classical ﬁrst-order logic, the classical ﬁrst-order relation M∗ ,
g | φ is deﬁned by induction in the standard way, where g is an assignment and φ is a ﬁrst-order formula (details are left
to the reader). The following easily provable proposition now states formally that the translation is truth-preserving.
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For any assignment g, it is the case thatM, g, g(a) | φ if and only ifM∗, g | STa(φ) (and the same for STb).
Thus, classical hybrid logic, considered as a language for talking about classical models, has the same expressive power
as the fragment of ﬁrst-order logic obtained by taking the image of hybrid logic under the translation STa .
Now, the important point here is that—with appropriate changes—the translation above also works in the intuitionistic
case. The ﬁrst change is that the connectives ∨ and ∃ in the ﬁrst-order language are taken to be primitive and the translation
is extended with the clauses
STa(φ ∨ ψ) = STa(φ) ∨ STa(ψ)
STa(♦φ) = ∃b
(
R(a,b) ∧ STb(φ)
)
In the intuitionistic case we observe that there is a bijective correspondence between models for intuitionistic hybrid logic
and models for intuitionistic ﬁrst-order logic with equality. Details are left to the reader, see [31] for the simpler corre-
spondence between modal-logical models and intuitionistic ﬁrst-order models without equality. The deﬁnition of a model
for intuitionistic ﬁrst-order logic with equality can be found in the book [32]. This leads to the following straightforward
proposition which says that the translation also preserves truth in the intuitionistic case.
Proposition 6. LetM be a model for intuitionistic hybrid logic and let φ be a hybrid-logical formula in which the nominals a and b do
not occur. For any element w of W and any w-assignment g, it is the case thatM, g,w, g(a) | φ if and only ifM∗, g,w | STa(φ)
(and the same for STb).
In the proposition above the relation M∗, g,w | STa(φ) says that the ﬁrst-order formula STa(φ) is intuitionistically true
relative to the intuitionistic ﬁrst-order model M∗ together with w and g .
It is important to note that in the proposition above the formulas are interpreted intuitionistically, not classically. Thus,
the formulas involved in the two translations are interpreted differently, that is, in the classical case they are interpreted
classically whereas in the intuitionistic case they are interpreted intuitionistically. Our semantics for intuitionistic hybrid
logic can therefore be seen as obtained by changing the interpretation of the ﬁrst-order metalanguage from classical to
intuitionistic. See [10] for more information. The introduction of ordinary intuitionistic modal logics via the standard trans-
lation has been considered a number of places, see in particular [18], which concentrates on intuitionistic versions of K
and S5, denoted respectively FS and MIPC. This idea can be traced back to the paper [13] which considers MIPC, that is,
intuitionistic S5.
2.2. Motivation via proof-theory
Another motivation for intuitionistic hybrid logic is that a natural deduction system for the logic can be obtained in a
very straightforward way by deleting the excluded middle from a natural deduction system for classical hybrid logic (and
adding derivation rules for the connectives ∨ and ♦). Technically, deleting the excluded middle amounts to adjusting the
derivation rule for ⊥ as appropriate. The classical hybrid-logical natural deduction system in question was given in the
papers [7] and [8]. The natural deduction system for intuitionistic hybrid logic thus obtained was given in the paper [12].
Conversely, if the excluded middle is added to the intuitionistic natural deduction system of [12], then we get back all the
derivable formulas of the classical natural deduction system, and the modal operator ♦ becomes deﬁnable in terms of 
(♦ becomes equivalent to ¬¬) and also ∨ becomes deﬁnable as usual. So only the excluded middle has to be added to
get the classical modality back from the intuitionistic modalities, which we think is signiﬁcant from a philosophical point
of view. In this sense the modalities do not have a constructive component of their own. This is in line with our earlier
mentioned distinction between the way of reasoning and what the reasoning is about. The above observations give a very
transparent relationship between proof-systems for intuitionistic and classical hybrid logic.
It should be mentioned that the natural deduction systems in question satisfy the requirements that such systems are
expected to satisfy, namely normalization such that normal proofs satisfy a version of the subformula property. Moreover,
natural deduction systems for wide classes of classical and intuitionistic hybrid logics can be obtained in a uniform way by
adding derivation rules as appropriate. Such additional derivation rules correspond to ﬁrst-order conditions on the accessi-
bility relation expressed by geometric theories: A ﬁrst-order formula is geometric if it is built out of atomic formulas of the
forms R(a, c) and a = c using only the connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, and ∃. A geometric theory is a ﬁnite set of closed ﬁrst-order
formulas each having the form ∀a(φ → ψ) where the formulas φ and ψ are geometric. So additional derivation rules cor-
responds to a geometric theory, and if the surrounding natural deduction system is classical, then the condition imposed
on the accessibility relation is the classical interpretation of the geometric theory, and if the surrounding natural deduction
system is intuitionistic, then the condition imposed is the intuitionistic interpretation of the geometric theory, that is, the
geometric theory interpreted as a statement in intuitionistic ﬁrst-order logic. Thus, the condition on the accessibility relation
in an intuitionistic proof-system can be seen as obtained by changing the interpretation of a geometric theory from classical
to intuitionistic (see also the remarks concluding the previous subsection).
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correspondence between Hilbert-style axiom systems for classical and intuitionistic hybrid logic, see [9]. To be more precise,
the intuitionistic axiom system can be seen as obtained from the classical axiom system by changing the surrounding
propositional logic from classical to intuitionistic and by adding axioms and rules for the connectives ∧, ∨, and ♦ (which
are not intuitionistically deﬁnable in terms of the other connectives). Again, rules for geometric theories can be added.
2.3. Relation to many-valued semantics
The intuitionistic semantics for hybrid logic given above is related to the many-valued semantics for hybrid logic given
in the paper [24]. In that paper the two-valued basis of classical hybrid logic is generalized to a many-valued basis involving
a truth-value space having the structure of a ﬁnite Heyting algebra. A notable feature of the many-valued semantics is that
it allows formulas as well as the accessibility relation to take on many truth-values, that is, the many-valued interpreta-
tions of the modal operators  and ♦ generalizes the classical two-valued interpretation, making use of the many-valued
accessibility relation.
To be more speciﬁc, let T denote a ﬁxed ﬁnite Heyting algebra. As part of this, T has join and meet operations (denoted
unionsq and ), and also, smallest and largest elements (denoted ⊥ and ). Moreover, for any elements y and z of T , there is
a greatest element x of T satisfying y  x  z. The element x is the relative pseudo-complement of y with respect to z
(denoted y ⇒ z). A many-valued model for hybrid logic is then a tuple (W , R, V ), where W is a set (the worlds), R is a
function from W × W to T (the many-valued accessibility relation), and V is a function from W × {p,q, r, . . .} to T . As in
the classical two-valued case, an assignment is a function g from {a,b, c, . . .} to W . The function V is inductively extended
to all formulas as follows.
V (w,a) =
{  if g(a) = w
⊥ else
V (w, φ ∧ ψ) = V (w, φ)  V (w,ψ)
V (w, φ ∨ ψ) = V (w, φ) unionsq V (w,ψ)
V (w, φ → ψ) = V (w, φ) ⇒ V (w,ψ)
V (w,⊥) = ⊥
V (w,φ) = {R(w, v) ⇒ V (v, φ) ∣∣ v ∈ W }
V (w,♦φ) = unionsq{R(w, v)  V (v, φ) ∣∣ v ∈ W }
V (w,@aφ) = V
(
g(a),φ
)
A formula φ is valid if and only if V (w, φ) =  for any model (W , R, V ) and any assignment g . Note that if the ﬁxed ﬁnite
Heyting algebra T is the two-valued Heyting algebra containing only the elements ⊥ and , then validity not surprisingly
coincides with the classical notion of validity considered in the ﬁrst section of the present paper. It is straightforward to
check that if a formula is valid with respect to the many-valued semantics, whatever ﬁxed ﬁnite Heyting algebra T is
considered, then it is also valid with respect to the classical two-valued semantics.
Note that the many-valued semantics assigns to a nominal the truth-value  in exactly one world, and ⊥ in all other
worlds. This is in agreement with the classical two-valued semantics for hybrid logic in which a nominal refers to a unique
world.
Now, if the notion of an intuitionistic model in Deﬁnition 2 above is restricted such that W is ﬁnite, Dw is constant, that
is, the same for any w , and ∼w is the identity relation, then an intuitionistic model, which accordingly can be written as
(W ,, D, {Rw }w∈W , {Vw}w∈W ), corresponds to a many-valued model as follow. We ﬁrst note that the -closed subsets of
W ordered by inclusion constitute a ﬁnite Heyting algebra, which we take to be the space T of truth-values. A many-valued
model (D, R∗, V ∗) is then deﬁned by letting
• R∗(d, e) = {w ∈ W | dRwe} and
• V ∗(d, p) = {w ∈ W | d ∈ Vw(p)}.
It can be proved that for any formula φ, it is the case that V ∗(d, φ) = {w ∈ W |M, g,w,d | φ}. Thus, with the men-
tioned restriction on the notion of an intuitionistic model, the intuitionistic semantics can be simulated by the many-valued
semantics.
There is also a correspondence in the opposite direction, enabling the many-valued semantics to be simulated by the
intuitionistic semantics. Given a ﬁnite Heyting algebra T and a many-valued model (D, R, V ), a restricted intuitionistic
model M= (W ,⊆, D, {R∗w }w∈W , {V ∗w}w∈W ) can be deﬁned by letting
• W = {w | w is a proper prime ﬁlter in T },
• dR∗we if and only if R(d, e) ∈ w , and• d ∈ V ∗w(p) if and only if V (d, p) ∈ w .
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restriction on intuitionistic models, the intuitionistic semantics is equivalent to the many-valued semantics for hybrid logic.
It is an open question how the many-valued and the intuitionistic semantics are related if the restriction on intuitionistic
models is removed.4 The above described equivalence between the two semantics for hybrid logic is taken from [24]. It is
an extension of a similar equivalence between an intuitionistic and a many-valued semantics for ordinary modal logic which
originally was given in [17]. In the latter paper, the epistemic worlds of the semantics are thought of as experts and the
epistemic partial order is thought of as a relation of dominance between experts: One expert dominates another one if
whatever the ﬁrst expert says is true is also said to be true by the second expert.
The above implies that if a formula is valid with respect to the intuitionistic semantics for hybrid logic, then it is also
valid with respect to the many-valued semantics, whatever ﬁnite Heyting algebra is chosen as the ﬁxed truth-value space
(as the many-valued semantics can be simulated by the intuitionistic semantics in the above sense and the set {} is a
proper prime ﬁlter). Since intuitionistic validity implies many-valued validity, and many-valued validity implies classical
validity, many-valued hybrid logics are logics between classical hybrid logic and intuitionistic hybrid logic. This is similar to
the fuzzy hybrid logics presented in [20] which constitute a linearly ordered set of logics between classical hybrid logic and
intuitionistic hybrid logic.
2.4. Relation to birelational semantics
In the intuitionistic semantics for hybrid logic considered hithertho in the present paper, the epistemic partial order is
separate from the interpretation of the hybrid-logical machinery as well as the accessibility relation involved in interpreting
modal operators. This semantics is an extension of a semantics for intuitionistic modal logic which has been considered a
number of places, in particular [16,31,18]. This semantics, which we shall refer to as the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic
modal logic, is different from a number of semantics for intuitionistic modal logics where the epistemic partial order and
the modal accessibility relation are relations on the same set. Such semantics are called birelational semantics.
It is a remarkable fact that there is a birelational semantics that validates exactly the same modal-logical formulas
as the Kripke semantics. This applies to a number of ordinary intuitionistic modal logics, including intuitionistic K and
intuitionistic S5, see the accounts given in [31] and [18]. Note that the Kripke semantics for hybrid logic considered in the
present paper is a hybrid-logical extension of K.
It is also a remarkable fact that the ﬁnite model property (if a formula is falsiﬁable, then it is falsiﬁable by a ﬁnite model)
is not satisﬁed relative to the Kripke semantics, but it is satisﬁed relative to the birelational semantics. Thus, via the ﬁnite
model property, the birelational semantics can serve as a vehicle for proving decidability. This technique of proving that an
intuitionistic modal logic is decidable has been used several places, see in particular [31] where it is used in connection
with a number of ordinary intuitionistic modal logics, including intuitionistic K and intuitionistic S5. See also [18] where
the proof of the ﬁnite model property is somewhat different.
A simple counterexample to the ﬁnite model property relative to the Kripke semantics is the formula ¬¬φ → ¬¬φ.
This formula is only falsiﬁable by inﬁnite Kripke models, whatever intuitionistic K, intuitionistic S5, or a number of other
intuitionistic modal logics are considered, cf. [31]. The intuitive reason why the ﬁnite model property holds for birelational
models, but fails for Kripke models, is that there are more birelational models than Kripke models, in the sense that every
Kripke model can in a truth-preserving way be “encoded” as a birelational model, but not vice versa, cf. [31]. The origin of
the counterexample above is [29].
Now, back to hybrid logic. In the paper [14], a birelational semantics for intuitionistic S5 has been extended with
satisfaction operators, and it has been proved that the birelational semantics satisﬁes the ﬁnite model property, from which
it follows that intuitionistic S5 with satisfaction operators is decidable. See the next section for the background of this work.
It is not clear how to add nominals to the birelational semantics, the problem being that if nominals are given their obvious
interpretation, namely singleton sets, then the interpretation of nominals cannot be preserved by the partial order, thus,
monotonicity is violated.
3. Other work on intuitionistic hybrid logic
A natural deduction system for an intuitionistic version of S5 extended with satisfaction operators has been proposed in
the paper [25], the aim being to provide a foundation for distributed functional programming languages where satisfaction
operators are used for reasoning about the distribution of resources at different locations.5 To this end the paper [25] gave
a Curry–Howard isomorphism for the natural deduction formulation of intuitionistic S5 with satisfaction operators.
4 The fact that in the intuitionistic semantics based on Deﬁnition 2, nominals are interpreted using a family {∼w }w∈W of equivalence relations, not
identity, seems to imply that in an equivalent many-valued semantics, nominals should be allowed to take on arbitrary truth-values, not just top and
bottom.
5 For a paper also having the aim being of providing a foundation for distributed functional programming languages, but using a natural deduction
system for intuitionistic S5 without satisfaction operators, see [26].
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deduction proofs correspond to terms of the lambda calculus (that is, programs), and normalization corresponds to reduction
(that is, evaluation), in particular:
• A program of type φ ∧ ψ evaluates to a pair (t,u) where t is of type φ and u is of type ψ .
• A program of type φ ∨ ψ evaluates either to inl(t) where t is of type φ or to inr(u) where u is of type ψ .
• A program of type φ → ψ evaluates to an abstraction λx.t where the variable x is of type φ and t is of type ψ .
See the book [22] for a general introduction to the Curry–Howard isomorphism. In the paper [25] the standard Curry–
Howard isomorphism for intuitionistic logic is extended with modal operators and satisfaction operators. Nominals represent
locations in a network and proofs correspond to distributed programs. Roughly, the extension is as follows.
• A program of type φ evaluates to a program of type φ which can be run at any location in the network.
• A program of type ♦φ evaluates to a program of type φ which can be run at some unspeciﬁed location in the network.
• A program of type @aφ evaluates to a program of type φ which can be run at location a.
Mainly being interested in proof-theoretic aspects of intuitionistic hybrid logic, the paper [25] did not give a Kripke se-
mantics. A Kripke semantics for the intuitionistic hybrid logic of [25], that is, intuitionistic S5 with satisfaction operators,
was given in the paper [14]. The Kripke semantics of [14] is similar to the one given in the papers [11] and [12], and also
described in the previous section of the present paper. In [14] it is proved that the natural deduction system given in [25]
is sound and complete relative to the Kripke semantics. In [14] it is also proved that the natural deduction system is sound
and complete relative to a birelational semantics.
The paper [19] gives a sequent system for intuitionistic S5 with satisfaction operators corresponding to the natural
deduction system considered in [25] and [14]. It is in [19] demonstrated how to turn this sequent system into a terminating
sequent system for the -free fragment such that if a sequent is not provable, then a ﬁnite Kripke model falsifying the
sequent can be deﬁned. From this it follows that intuitionistic S5 with satisfaction operators does satisfy the ﬁnite model
property with respect to the Kripke semantics if the  modality is disregarded. A decision procedure for full intuitionistic
hybrid logic is described in the paper [21].6
4. Open problems
In the present paper we have reported the state-of-the-art of intuitionistic hybrid logic. Below we list a number of
obvious open problems.
No other results on the ﬁnite model property and decidability are known besides the above mentioned [14,19,21].
No complexity results are known for intuitionistic hybrid logics. According to [18], intuitionistic S5 is decidable in non-
deterministic double exponential time, but it is not known whether this upper bound is optimal. Also according to [18], it
is unknown whether intuitionistic K is elementarily decidable.
No interpolation or Beth deﬁnability results are known for intuitionistic hybrid logics. No functional completeness results
are known. No axiomatizations are known beside the one given in [9]. Finally, let us remark that no intuitionistic hybrid
logics have yet been implemented.
A number of works have proposed intuitionistic versions of description logics, which are a family of modal logics used
for knowledge representation in Artiﬁcial Intelligence. The paper [15] considers an intuitionistic version of the description
logic ALC , which is a notational variant of classical multi-modal K. The description logic in [15] is introduced via the
standard translation to ﬁrst-order intuitionistic logic, exactly like it is the case with intuitionistic hybrid logic. The paper
[6] also follows this recipe, but in this paper ﬁrst-order intuitionistic logic is extended with what is called the Kuroda
Principle ∀a¬¬φ → ¬¬∀aφ. In the modal semantics this principle corresponds to any epistemic state having at least one
ﬁnite element in its future, where a ﬁnite element is an element with no elements in its future. It is in [6] conjectured
that the Kuroda Principle imply that the resulting modal logic satisﬁes the ﬁnite model property (but this is not proved).
A paraconsistent version of the intuitionistic description logic of [15] is considered in [34] (similar to the paraconsistent
hybrid logic given in [9]). Now, classical description logics has metalinguistic statements (called ABox-statements) with the
same effect as satisfaction operators. Also, some classical description logics involve nominals. An obvious line of future
work would therefore be to import satisfaction operators and nominals from intuitionistic hybrid logic to the context of
intuitionistic description logics.
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